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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PAROLE STATUS
AND THE PRIVILEGE CONCEPT
According to traditional notions, a parolee is not entitled to
even the minimal safeguards of procedural due process. The
Sixth Circuit echoed those sentiments in the recent case of Rose
v. Haskins. This note, however, maintains that the Rose ra-
tionale, when analyzed in light of contemporary Supreme Court
decisions, is no longer viable.
In Rose v. Haskins,' the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reiterated the orthodox view that since a prisoner parole system is
not constitutionally compelled, parole status is merely a "privilege"
regulated by statute and not circumscribed by either the specific
constitutional guarantees applicable to a criminal proceeding nor
the traditional safeguards of procedural due process. However,
recent Supreme Court decisions have so undercut the basic
assumptions surrounding the "privilege" concept that the analyses
and conclusions of Rose and its predecessors have been rendered
highly questionable.
In 1964, petitioner Rose was paroled from concurrent
sentences for conviction of forgery and passage of valueless checks.
However, the Ohio Paroles Commission summarily revoked its
grant when petitioner's ex-wife accused him of the molestation of
their minor daughter. Upon rejection of his request to- be
prosecuted on the molestation charge,2 Rose instituted a habeas
corpus action attacking the constitutional validity of his
confinement based upon revocation of parole without a hearing,
claiming violation of his rights under the fourth, sixth, eighth,
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Denied relief first in Ohio
and then by a United States district court, Rose filed his appeal
with the Sixth Circuit. In affirming the decision below, the court
concluded that parole status is merely a "privilege" granted by the
grace of the state, and not a "right" protected by procedural due
process. It was further emphasized that the procedural safeguards
'388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968).
2 Rose claimed that the prosecutor's reason for this rejection was that "he could not
prosecute without a warrant from [Rose's] accuser." Id. at 92.
Id. at 95.
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claimed by Rose are only applicable in criminal cases prior to a
conviction and that judicial review of state administrative
procedures involving the post conviction disposition of criminals is
a wholly unwarranted interference with an "exclusively state
function." 4 Having thus disposed of the constitutional arguments,
the court relegated Rose to his remedies under the Ohio parole
statutes and, finding no provision for a hearing therein, dismissed
the appeal.'
The privilege-right distinction, as delineated in Rose, has been
used to dispose of numerous claims associated with conditional
prison releases6 and a variety of other forms of governmental
largess.7 But the supporting rationale, that a gratuitous grant can
4 Id. at 93, 96.
1 Both the states and the federal government have provided enabling legislation creating
parole commissions which are possessed with characteristically broad discretionary powers as
to the selection of parole candidates, imposition of restrictions on their status, and
revocation for violation of those conditions. See Parole, 13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 209
(1967). However, state statutory provisions as to the procedural requirements necessary at
parole revocation proceedings differ widely: nine explicitly deny any right to a hearing-
sixteen (including Ohio) make no provision for a hearing; twenty-ive explicitly require a
hearing. In a small number of jurisdictions the legislatures have provided such further
safeguards as confrontation, cross-examination, and presence of counsel. See Sklar, Law and
Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964).
' Foremost among these decisions is Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), in which Justice
Cardozo, while construing the Federal Probation Act to require notice and hearing prior to
probation revocation, stated that "we do not accept the petitioner's contention that the
privilege [of hearing] has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute." Id. Likewise,
a majority of jurisdictions still view parole and probation as being entirely regulated by
statute, and invoke the privilege-right distinction to counter all claims to procedural due
process. E.g., Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Patterson, 389
- F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968). Curtis v. Bennett, 351 F.2d 931 (8th Cir. 1965); Richardson v.
Markley, 339 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1965); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964);
Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th
Cir. 1949), affd, 340 U.S. 880 (1950). But see Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir.
1941). Current construction of Federal Probation and Parole Statutes allows for the parolee
to present voluntary witnesses, see. e.g., Reed v. Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
and have the assistance of retained counsel. Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
The Federal Board is not bound by the formal rules of evidence, Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), and "most of the testimony presented by both sides is
hearsay in the strict evidentiary sense." Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 Gbo.
L.J. 705, 716-17 (1968). See also Note, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 617 (1968).
7 E.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (deportation); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
U.S. 442 (1954) (teaching in public school); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.
338 U.S. 537 (1950) (immigration); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir, 1950)
(government employment), affd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Hornstein v. Illinois Liquor (ontrol
Comm'n, 412 Ill. 365, 106 N.E.2d 354 (1952) (licensing); Walker v. City of Clinton, 244
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be withdrawn or revoked in any manner which the grantor may
employ, has come under increasing attack,8 and recent Supreme
Court decisions indicate that the assumptions upon which it rests
are demonstrably unsound.' The Court has recognized that status
Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953) (liquor licensing); Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass.
531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954) (public school employment); Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215,
55 N.W.2d 620 (1952) (driver's license); Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119
N.E.2d 373 (1954) (public school employment); Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227,
381 P.2d 718 (1963) (public school employment).
For instance, in Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the
Court concluded that the question of whether summary dismissal of a short-order cook from
a defense facility was a denial of due process "cannot be answered by easy assertion that,
because she had no constitutional right to be there in the first place, she was not deprived of
liberty or property by the Superintendent's action." Id. at 894. See note 12 infra.
' The initial erosion of the privilege-right distinction appears to have been in those areas in
which the grant of the benefit or status was conditioned upon the grantee's agreement,
explicit or implied, to abstain from thq exercise of some right protected by an express clause
in the Constitution. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958). See also Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966). Lacking such a
direct effect on an express right, the Court will attempt to balance competing public and
private concerns to determine whether the regulation's "incidental" effect on constitutional
rights (the so-called "chilling effect") is outweighed by a closely-connected important state
interest in enforcing the particular statute or pursuing the particular custom. See Albertson
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. I (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
A further method of circumventing the privilege-right distinction has been through the
equal protection clause. That is, regulations limiting eligibility for a "privilege" to that class
of persons willing to conform to "unreasonable" rules of conduct have been consistently
struck down as arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Finally, certain decisions indicate that the distinction may be circumvented by relying on
an independent right to procedural due process which requires at least minimum procedural
standards (such as a hearing) to help assure that a condition of the "privilege" had, in fact,
been violated, see Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (concurring opinion); Homer v. Richmond, 292
F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961), or to insure that the action taken was not based upon an
unconstitutional condition. See Thorpe v. Durham Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678-79
(1967) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring), reh. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3345 (1968).
For an excellent discussion of the above, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Privilege-
Right Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
The argument proposed here in the context of parole revocations is that since the reasons
for revocation cannot be arbitrary or capricious, (Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216
(19.2). See also United States v. Ryser, 99 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1938); Swan v. State, 200 Md.
429, 90 A.2d 690 (1952)), there at least must be a hearing to insure that there is a non-
arbitrary factual basis for the commission's decision. Moreover, since the right to be free
from restraint is carefully safeguarded, it is necessary to balance this right against the state
interest in denying procedural safeguards so as to determine whether such denial is
"reasonable" or is "arbitrary" in terms of the goals and functions of a parole system.
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interests, whether originally acquired as privileges or rights, are
constitutionally protected and that
[w]hether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in
a specific proceeding depends upon . . . the nature of the alleged
right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible
burden on that proceeding . . .,
Judicial reliance on the "privilege" concept has thus given way to a
process of inquiry whereby courts undertake a thorough study of
the objectives and procedures of the program in question as well as
the nature of the status interest involved, in order ultimately to
determine whether the alleged need to deny due process protections
at a revocation or withdrawal proceeding is justified by state
interests important enough to outweigh the resulting effect on the
interests of the individual." Indeed, recent decisions indicate that
even where there is a substantial state interest involved, at least the
minimum procedural safeguard of a hearing must be afforded as a
built-in assurance that an administrative decision is not based on
grounds that are arbitrary, capricious, or in derogation of a
constitutional guarantee.'2 This expanded view of the scope of
procedural due process thus mandates a re-evaluation and analysis
of parole status and parole revocation procedure far different from
the inquiry made by the Sixth Circuit in Rose v. Haskins.
Parole is the release of a criminal from a penal institution under
supervision and prescribed conditions which, if violated, may
necessitate reimprisonment.'" The state's interest in granting parole,
10 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
"Thus, summary dismissal of a short-order cook deemed to be a security risk was held
justified when denial of her employment interest was balanced against the government's
interest in the freedom of administration and the fullest security of key facilities. Cafeteria
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). On the other hand, due process was found
to require a hearing prior to the dismissal of a student from a state university, for the student's
interest in his education, both in terms of personal improvement and future opportunity, was
viewed as "outbalancing" the university's interest in taking summary action to discipline
"troublemakers." Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
"See Thorpe v. Durham Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670,674 (1967) (Douglas, J.. concur-
ring), reh. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3345 (1968); Joint Anti-Fascism Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Welch v. Beto, 355 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 385
U.S. 839 (1966); Homer v. Richmond, '292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Holt v. Richmond
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966).
"See J. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 546 (1963); Parole, 13 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 209 (1967). A basic difference among the three forms of conditional
liberty-parole, probation, and conditional pardon--is that parole is an administrative
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while partially economic,'4 is primarily the rehabilitation of the
criminal so as both to protect society and to create a law-abiding
citizen.'5 But to the extent that his actions are restrained by certain
conditions, the parolee remains in the "custody" of the state
authorities, who have a continuing interest in his observance of
these conditions. Thus, upon reasonable cause to believe that a
parolee has been guilty of a violation, parole commissions generally
have both the statutory authority and the obligation to make full
inquiry into the truth of accusations as well as to determine
whether the alleged violative act was accompanied by any
mitigating circumstances. The commissions then exercise their
penological expertise in making a discretionary decision as to
whether the state interest would best be served by reimprisonment,
alteration of the parolee's conditions, or release upon the same
function, probation a judicial function and conditional pardon an executive function. In
substance, however, there is little difference between the three. See Comment, 12 WAYNE L.
REv. 638 (1966). Probation is granted by the trial judge, usually prior to sentencing, but, as
in the other two forms of conditional release, the probationer loses the right to vote, to hold
public office, to hold or dispose of certain property, and to receive licenses. See Adult
Probation, 13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 159, 163-64 (1967). Conditional pardon, on the other
hand, is granted by the governor, but, as a form of prisoner release, is "slowly becoming
extinct," although it often serves as precedent to "form the basis in many jurisdictions for
modern parole revocation decisions." Sklar, supra note 5, at 184. It is asserted, however,
that for purposes of revocation proceedings the differences between the three forms lack legal
significance, for in each case the essence of the proceeding is (1) the factual determination of
a breach of conditions, (2) a weighing and evaluating of all factors involved, and (3) a
disposition which serves the public interest in rehabilitation. See Newman, The Process of
Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CALIF. L. REV. 215 (1961); Comment, 12 WAYNE L. REV.
638 (1966). But see Comment, The Rights of the Probationer: A Legal Limbo, 28 U. PITT.
L. REv. 643, 651 (1967). Moreover, it is arguable that those states which assign different
rights to revocation proceedings involving different types of conditional liberty violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Comment, 12 WAYNE L. REV., supra
at 652-53.
" See Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 311 (1959);
Comment, Revocation of Conditional Liberty-California and the Federal System, 28 S.
CAL. L. REV. 158 (1955). One commentator reaches the conclusion that factors such as
overcrowded prisons and the cost of feeding and clothing the inmates renders economics "the
primary consideration underlying parole." Comment, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 638, 640 (1966);
see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Kimball & Newman, Judicial
Intervention in Constitutional Decisions: Threat and Response, 14 CRIME & DELINQUENCY I,
5 (1968).
" Bates, Probation and Parole as Elements in Crime Prevention, I LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 484 (1934); Note, Fair Educational Practices Acts: A Solution to Discrimination? 64
HARv. L. REV. 307, 309 (1951). See also Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in
the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1961).
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conditions as were originally imposed.'6
This analysis of the parole revocation process reveals that a
primary interest of the state is the proper penological disposition of
a parolee, based upon an accurate factual determination of whether
or not there was a violation, and a full consideration of possible
mitigating circumstances. Thus, it would seem in the best interest
of the state to insure the accuracy of the factual determination by
imposing upon itself the slight burden of providing the parolee with
the minimum protection of a hearing. The public purpose served by
denying a hearing is, at best, remote;7 while in terms of society's
interest in the rehabilitation of criminals, it seems that a summary
revocation creates the very antithesis of the mutual trust between
the parolee and the law which parole is designed to engender.
Indeed, the only viable state objection, and one which appears
throughout the Rose opinion, is that "legislation defining what
conduct constitutes a crime and fixing the sentence to be imposed
upon conviction therefor and the manner in which the sentence
shall be served"' 9 is exclusively a state function. But this fear of
36 E.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2965.21 (Page 1963 Supp.); see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Parole, 13 CRINIE &
DELINQUENCY 209 (1967).
" The usual policy reasons supporting denial were presented by the Ohio Supreme Court in
In re Varner, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 249, 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957), and were
examined by Judge Celebreeze in his dissent to Rose. 388 F.2d at 101-02. Those reasons
include, first, a fear that the public will be endangered by allowing a supposed violator to be
at large until a hearing is arranged. The obvious reply to this is that within the criminal trial
context this danger has been dealt with by the simple device of temporary detention without
bail prior to a determination of guilt. Secondly, it is frequently contended that accusers,
fearing reprisal, will not testify if they must confront the parolee. But this fear, however
valid, should not serve to deny parolees a hearing. Denial of confrontation may be justified
in certain contexts, see discussion of Williams v. New York, note 35 infra, but such denial is
generally deemed to run counter to the whole notion of "fundamental fairness," while further
increasing the danger that secret accusations may be based on faulty or biased information.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41, 43 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, this observation appears especially apt within the context of Rose in
which the parolee's accuser was his ex-wife, who apparently was unwilling to swear out a
warrant on the charge. Finally, objections have been raised to the increased burden on the
parole commissions which would result from the imposition of procedural requirements. This
fear, however, is not substantiated by evidence, see 388 F.2d at 102, and, nevertheless,
must be deemed inconsequential when weighed against the conflicting interests of the parolee.
See notes 25-27 infra and accompanying text.
"See Felming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Stat v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah
296, 303, 259 P. 1044, 1046 (1927).
" 388 F.2d at 93. In support of the state-function contention, the court cited its own recent
decision in Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 943
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judicial legislation and administration of a state's penal system ap-
pears wholly unwarranted. By imposing minimum protections at
parole revocation proceedings the courts are merely concerning
themselves with the constitutional validity of the methods of fact
determination which the legislature has selected." Certainly, the
courts still must defer to the expertise of the appointed authorities
in their application of nonarbitrary criteria, in their evaluation of
facts fairly established, and in their discretion as to the final dispo-
sition of each case.
Moreover, while no substantial public interest is served by
denying a hearing, such denial could result in considerable harm to
the interests of a parolee. It is obvious that a parolee's liberty is
being substantially curtailed by the revocation of parole and that he
is entitled to some assurance that the factual basis for such
deprivation is arrived at fairly and accurately." Likewise, even if
(1968). However, at least one commentator has concluded that this decision is divorced from
the current thought in the peno-correctional field and is overly conservative in the context of
recent decisions. See Note, C(onstitutional Law: Prison "No-Assistance' Regulations and the
Jailhouse Lawyer, 1968 Duke L.J. 343. Certainly running counter to the absolute "hands
off" attitude suggested by the 6th Circuit are such decisions as Lee v. Washington, 263 F.
Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aJj'd per curiani, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), in which the court
declared: "[lit is well established that prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights and
that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment follow
them into prison and protect them there from unconstitutional action on the part of prison
authorities carried out under color of state law." Id. at 331; see. e.g.. Cooper v. Pate, 378
U.S. 546 (1965). That is, while commitment to a penal institution following conviction
necessarily results in the imposition of a number of restraints, these restraints must be
reviewed to determine if they are justified as necessities of prison security and discipline, or
as unavoidable consequences in the process of rehabilitation. See, e.g.. Lee v. Washington,
263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), afj'd per curiani, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). See also Note,
Suits by Black Muslim Prisoners to Enforce Religious Rights-Obstacles to a Hearing On
the Merits, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 528 (1966); Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison
Administration, 9 W.%i. & MARY L. REV. 178 (1967). Further, while a parolee conceptually
may be deemed a "prisoner" by the fact that the conditions on his liberty constitute
"custody," the requirements of security and discipline which support restrictions on a
prisoner's -substantive and procedural rights are substantially diminished once the parolee has
left the confines of the prison. Thus, the mere assertion that "a state prisoner on parole is in
custody," which was already made by the majority in Rose, is an insufficient basis for the
conclusion that such a prisoner "does not have a constitutional right to a hearing on a state
parole revocation." 388 F.2d at 95.
"
0See In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 71 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909).
2' Recent Supreme Court decisions have greatly expanded the individual's due process
rights in proceedings which threaten to restrain one's liberty. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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one of his parole conditions has been violated, the parolee retains
an interest in the opportunity to present mitigating circumstances,
such as evidence of his good character or of the involuntary na-
ture of the breach,22 so that the parole authority can make a more
reasonable, and perhaps more lenient disposition of his
case within the range of available alternatives. Beyond this
interest in his basic freedoms, the parolee also has an interest in
safeguarding any personal reputation he had retained or regained
within his community, as well as any meaningful chance for future
employment.
Denial of the minimum safeguard of a revocation hearing serves
neither the state's interest i n an effective and rehabilitative parole
system nor the parolee's interest in retaining his liberty, for neither
interest is validly served without procedural safeguards to help
guarantee greater accuracy in the fact-determining process.
Therefore, the Rose court should not have relied on the simplistic
privilege-right analysis, but instead should have initiated a more
detailed inquiry into petitioner's substantial due process claims.
Such an inquiry would reveal that basic notions of fundamental
fairness demanded that Rose be afforded an opportunity to be heard
prior to the crucial determination made by the Commission.
Having concluded that due process requires a parole revocation
hearing,- there still remains the important question of whether
1' E.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Combs
v. LaVallee, 239 N.E.2d 743, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1968); Baine v. Beckstead. 10 Utah 2d 4,
347 P.2d 554 (1959); Hudson v. Youell, 178 Va. 525, 17 S.E.2d 403 (1941). modijied oil
other grounds, 179 Va. 442, 19 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 630 (1942).
-1 It should be noted that in addition to the privilege-right distinction, there are a number
of other theories which are frequently relied upon to deny a parolee due process protections
at revocation proceedings. While the theory of "constructive custody" has already been
analyzed, note 22 supra, the "contract" and "parens patriae" theories merit brief discussion.
The contract theory involves the assertion that a parolee accepts the condition of summary
revocation of his status at the time of the parole grant and that he thereby waives all claim
to his right to due process. See Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); In re
Lorette, 126 Vt. 286, 228 A.2d 790 (1967). This theory, while ironically recognizing that there
is a right to due process which has been waived, has a fundamental weakness in that the
waiver is obviously coercive and thus invalid. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Burns v.
United States specifically stated that a parole grant "is not a contract, but a favor." 287
U.S. at 220.
The most recent argument, as expressed in Hyser v. Reed. 318 F.2d 125, 138 (D.C. Cir.
1963), is that the parole commission acts as parens patriae of the parolee and that therefore
the protections of due process are unnecessary. However, any validity to this argument has
now been completely undercut by the Supreme Court's analysis and conclusion in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
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such a hearing should include any further procedural safeguards.-"
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has recently enunciated procedural
guidelines for situations closely analogous to parole revocation. For
instance, in Mempa v. Rhay25 the Court held that a convicted
criminal has a right to counsel at a proceeding for revocation of
probation when that proceeding involves the imposition of a
deferred sentence. The Court reasoned that because the degree of
punishment is partially dependent upon a discretionary assessment
of a probationer's character, prior conduct, and various other
factors, there is a vital necessity "for the aid of counsel in
marshalling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating
circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to
present his case as to sentence. 216 The Court further emphasized
that the necessity for counsel is even more compelling since
imposition of sentence on the prior conviction "is based on the
alleged commission of offenses for which the accused is never
tried." 7
The rationale in Mempa appears equally applicable to parole
revocation proceedings. The similarity and inter-relationship
between parole and sentencing processes has been recognized by the
Supreme Court - and has led the President's Commission on Crime
to observe that "parole legislation essentially involves a delegation
of sentencing power -to the parole board. -9 It is equally evident
-" A person is entitled to a "quality of hearing at least minimally proportioned to the
gravity of what he otherwise stands to lose through administrative fiat." Van Alstyne, supra
note 9, at 1452.
:' 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
" Id. at 135.
' Id. at 137. See also Perry v. Williard, Ore. , 427 P.2d 1020 (1967); State v.
Edelblute, 91 Idaho 469, 424 P.2d 739 (1967).
" Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The Court indicated that while the
sentencing judge fixes the early portion of the sentence, parole and probation commissions
often fix the details of the latter portion, thereby implementing the policy of individualizing
punishment to fit the changing needs of each case. The Court concluded that to effectively
implement this policy a sentencing judge must possess the "fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics" and that he "not be denied an
opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive
rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial." Id. at 247. It therefore appears that if the
parole and sentencing processes are deemed strictly analogous, Mempa would support a
parolee's right to counsel, although Williams would be sufficient basis for denying him the
right to confrontation and cross-examination. But see text accompanying notes 39-43 injra.
' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 86 (1967).
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that the parolee's need and interest in having counsel's aid
throughout the revocation process is just as great as that of the
criminal upon whom initial sentence is being imposed,"0 since the
same basic personal interest in freedom is involved.
But while it is useful to analogize the evaluative-dispositional
phase of parole revocation and the sentencing phase of criminal
prosecution,3' there remains a vital distinction. At the time of
sentencing, a criminal's guilt has already been established and all
that remains is the discretionary assessment, based on a variety of
sources, as to what should be the proper penological disposition for
the individual. On the other hand, a parole board's initial and
primary function is the factual determination of a violation of the
parole conditions, and it is only after such a determination that the
board's discretionary dispositional powers can be exercised. The
importance of this fact-finding function in terms of due process
considerations has recently been stressed by the Court in dealing
with other proceedings traditionally characterized as
"discretionary.'" 2 In Gault33 the Court closely analyzed juvenile
delinquency proceedings. While noting a valid state purpose in
special treatment for youthful offenders 4 and recognizing the need
for judicial deference to administrative expertise,"5 the Court
nevertheless condemned the "unbridled discretion" of juvenile
courts. Since an essential element of the proceeding was J tcl-
finding3 6 and since an individual's freedom was at stake," due
'o Mempa is not clear as to what role counsel is to assume in relation to the factual
determination of whether or not a probation violation did occur. However, the thrust of the
decision is not in this direction, but rather is toward the aid of counsel in presenting all
evidence and implications favorable to the probationer, so that these factors, along with the
trial judge's recommendations, can be considered by the commission prior to the exercise of
its discretionary sentencing power. In the context of parole revocations, therefore, Mentpa
would primarily support the right to counsel at the evaluative or dispositional phase of the
proceeding wherein the commission exercises its discretion following a finding of a breach of
conditions.
" See note 30 supra.
12 E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See also note
13 supra.
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process was found to require that the juvenile be afforded notice of
the charges, representation by counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination, privilege against self-incrimination, and sufficient
specificity of findings to allow for meaningful appeal. 8 In a
subsequent decision, Specht v. Patterson,39 the Court reaffirmed its
prior position in Williams v. New York," but concluded that where
the specific basis for imposition of a sentence is "a new finding of fact
that was not an ingredient of the offense charged,""' the factual
determination must be made at a hearing in which the defendant is
afforded "the full panoply" of procedural rights. - Thus, although
the situations in Gault and Specht are on the surface
distinguishable from parole revocation,43 each stands for the
proposition that where there is a genuine factual dispute, the
outcome of which may result in restraint of personal liberty, more
formalized procedures, beyond a hearing, are required.
Applying this rationale to parole revocation, it seems clear that
while a parolee needs aid of counsel at the evaluative phase of the
proceeding, 44 that need is even more compelling when he is faced
with a specific accusation of a designated offense, the alleged
commission of which constitutes the very basis for placing his
conditional freedom in jeopardy.45 Likewise, the parolee and his
counsel should be provided with notice of charges so that they have
time to gather evidence and prepare defenses to the allegations
"Id. at 31-58.
'4386 U.S. 605 (1967).
"337 U.S. 241 (1949). See note 28 supra.
"Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
"Id. at 609.
"The main distinction appears to be that in both the Gault and the Specht opinions the
Court indicated that it was not dealing with the post-conviction dispositional aspects of the
questions presented. Mempa. however, arose in the context of probation revocation, and the
Supreme Court found the Gault situation analogous.
" See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
" The President's Commission on Law Enforcement recently reported its similar
conclusion, stating in part: "The offender threatened with revocation should therefore be
entitled to a hearing comparable to the nature and importance of the issue being decided.
Where there is some dispute as to whether he violated the conditions of his release, the
hearing should contain the basic elements of due process--those elements which are designed
to ensure accurate fact finding . . . [-] such essential rights as reasonable notice of the
charges, the right to present evidence and witnesses, the right to representation by
counsel -including the right to appointed counsel-and the right to confront and cross-
examine opposing witnesses." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 88 (1967).
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involved. They should be allowed to present all relevant evidence in
denial or mitigation of the charges, and should be provided with a
transcript of the proceeding sufficient to delineate the grounds for
the commissions' decision.
This analysis further suggests that the parolee should have the
right to confront and cross-examine accusing witnesses either at the
hearing or by interrogatories prior to the hearing. Since the factual
determination is so vital to the interests of the parolee, it appears
fundamentally unfair to deny him the right to question the very
source of the accusations against him.", The importance of
confrontation and cross-examination in a proceeding which involves
the resolution of conflicting evidentiary implications was stressed in
both Gault and Specht as well as in a number of decisions
involving various analogous areas of administrative law, 7
Moreover, the burden and inconvenience to the state seems slight
when weighed against the fact that the imposition of such
additional administrative machinery will insure greater accuracy in
the factual 'determination process and thereby serve the interests of
both the public and the parolee. Finally, it is contended that the
imposition of the above safeguards still allows for flexibility in the
administration of parole revocation proceedings. The commission
can still maintain control over the fact-finding process by directing
the scope of the inquiry and placing reasonable limitations upon
counsel's questioning. 9 Moreover, once having ascertained that a
violation occurred, the commission retains its great latitude in the
exercise of its discretionary powers, for while Mempa would
indicate that counsel is required at this evaluative-dispositional
phase, Williams precludes any sound contention that the
informational sources utilized therein must be at all restricted by
the rules of admissible evidence."
In summary, the consistent denial of minimal due process
Id. For a detailed analysis of these rights, see the majority opinion in it re Gault. 387 U.S.
I (1967).
" E.g.. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963): Cafeteria
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Garrott v. United States, 340 F.2d 615 (Ct. Cl. 1965); see
McKay, The Right to Conjrontation, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 122 (1959).
4 See also SKLAR, note 5, supra, at 195.
"'See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.16 (Supp. 1965).
"0 See note 28 supra.
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protections to a parolee faced with an administrative proceeding in
which the retention of his status is at stake, is based on
assumptions which are demonstrably unsound. Further, analysis of
parole status and revocation proceedings shows that both state and
parolee purposes and interests are best served when the accuracy of
the facts upon which the parole authorities act is guaranteed by the
imposition of certain procedural safeguards. Finally, by drawing
analogies from recent decisions it seems clear that due process
requires that in the fact-determining phase a parolee must be
afforded notice of charges, presence of counsel, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, and a transcript of the proceedings;
while in the dispositional phase he should at least have aid of
counsel and a chance to present evidence in mitigation of his guilt.

